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How to Enhance Market Liquidity
Exchange in financial markets may be diversified in a variety of dimensions. They may
differ in the attributes of the traded assets, in the location of the exchange, in the time of the
transaction, and in the manner that the transaction takes place. Further, markets differ in the
degree of participation of intermediaries and in the role they play in the market.
Certain aspects of diversification are inherently desirable to market participants. Some
types of financial exchange diversification are necessary for the particular way that the market
works, including the way in which price is discovered in the market. Still other types of
diversification arise naturally out of competition among exchanges. The variety of possible
organizations of financial markets allows for comparisons among them. First we need to define
the criteria of evaluation.1
A financial exchange should be structured so as to maximize the satisfaction of
participants and potential participants. This is accomplished by minimizing transaction costs,
establishing market prices that accurately reflect the underlying equilibrium prices, and by
reducing the uncertainty that traders face in market interactions. In a related paper, Economides
and Schwartz (1993) discuss in detail how the introduction of electronic calls in the presence of
a continuous market may have very significant benefits. They discuss the benefits of the call in
enhancing liquidity, order handling, information revelation, market transparency, market
anonymity, and avoidance of free riding. The aspect we focus in this short paper is liquidity.
We will argue that call markets provide coordination of trades in the time dimension, and thus
1 See Economides (1993a) for a discussion of a financial market as a network.
2increase expected profits for traders. We further discuss how to best coordinate traders in their
order placement in a call market, so as to achieve the highest possible market-wide profits.2
Liquidity plays a crucial role in financial exchange markets. Without the availability of
counter-offers, markets cease to exist and they are replaced by individualized bilateral contracts.
Thus, some liquidity is necessary even for the existence of a financial exchange market. Further,
high liquidity expands the set of potential counter-offers and enhances the probability of a
favorable match. Thus, higher liquidity increases the expected level of satisfaction (utility) of
market participants.3 This is true irrespective of the particulars of the organization of the market.
However, the realization of the enhancing role of market liquidity has very important implications
on the relative benefits and drawbacks of different market organizations. Clearly, spatial
consolidation of markets tends to increase liquidity. To increase liquidity further, we consider
next the effects of time consolidation of markets in the form of an electronic call market.
Continuous markets tend to exhibit little inherent liquidity. In these markets, liquidity is
provided to a large extent by special intermediaries, market-makers, and specialists. However,
the artificial creation of liquidity increases transaction costs in such markets. In contrast,
electronic call markets inherently exhibit high liquidity because they implement the bunching of
orders over time and their simultaneous execution. Thus, potentially call markets can offer lower
transaction costs than continuous markets.
2 For many non-economists, coordination to an equilibrium that is better for all traders seems
utopian, if not quite impossible. However, it is truly possible to create trading environments and
mechanisms that do better than other environments for all traders, i.e., are Pareto superior to
other environments. Disbelief of this fact is similar to the widespread disbelief among non-
economists of the fact that bilateral trade can be beneficial to all parties involved.
3 See Economides and Siow (1985, 1988), Economides (1992).
3An electronic call market may be organized as a price scan double-sided auction.4 The
call, or market clearing, happens at a pre-specified time T. Market participants are connected
to the auctioneer at the exchange through a network of electronic terminals. Orders are taken
by the exchange from time t0 < T up to time T. Orders without contingencies (or with
contingencies that have been met) are displayed in aggregate form to all market participants.5
Thus, in the time interval [t0, T] preceding the call, every trader is able to see the evolving
aggregate demand and supply in the upcoming call market.
We model call markets in the presence of a continuous market that is functioning in
parallel during the period in which orders are submitted to the call market. In deciding to
participate in the electronic call, many traders accept to delay their market participation. That
is, many traders have decided well before the call to trade, but wait for the call instead of
sending their orders to the continuous market that is still be in operation in the interval [t0, T].
In making such a choice, a trader evaluates the lower transaction fees and reduced market
uncertainty in the call market in comparison with the risk of price changes during the waiting
period between the decision to trade and the call. Economides and Heisler (1993b) discuss the
choices of traders under these circumstances.
4 For a description of the specifics of the market clearing mechanism see Economides
(1993b).
5 The call market can accommodate stock-specific contingencies and market-wide
contingencies. For example, a stock-specific contingency may require that the orders of an
individual trader do not exceed a certain percentage of the orders on the other side of the market.
A market-wide contingency may require that the after-the-call exposure of a trader in the whole
market (or for a specific collection of stocks) is limited to a certain value.
4It is generally assumed that market participants demand immediacy, i.e., immediate
execution of their transactions. This is disputed by Economides and Schwartz (1993a) who see
the present demand for immediacy less as an inherent demand but rather as an effect of the
present market organization. Economides and Schwartz (1993b) develop a questionnaire
(distributed through Trader Forum of the Institutional Investor in winter 1994) that attempts to
evaluate the demand for immediacy by assessing how much delay traders are willing to accept
in return for a reduction in transaction fees.
The extent of liquidity at the call is crucial. The more liquid the call, the more attractive
it is to traders. This mechanism is self-reinforcing: the more traders participate, the more liquid
the call becomes. This self-reinforcing mechanism could exist in expectations of trader
participation that get realized (fulfilled) at the time of the call. That is, a large number of traders
anticipate (expect) that a large number of other traders will participate in the call; therefore they
themselves participate in the call, and the expectation of large participation is fulfilled. This is
certainly an equilibrium, but it is hardly the only one. In fact, it is not difficult to show that any
size of participation is an equilibrium, including zero participation. If everyone expected no-
one else to participate in the call, he wouldn’t participate himself, and the market would not exist.
Given the wide multiplicity of expectations equilibria, it is clear that there is a need to create
a specific mechanism that can support a single equilibrium of large participation.6
6 In this analysis, we use knowledge on network externalities developed in the New Theory
of Industrial Organization. A network externality is a production or consumption positive size
externality. In a typical network, the addition of a new customer (or network node) increases the
willingness to pay for network services by all participants. In a financial exchange network, high
liquidity in a particular market is a network externality, since it increases the willingness of all
traders to participate in that market, and traders receive this effect for free.
5The mechanism we propose utilizes two elements: commitments to trade and discounts
in fees and/or commissions. Large participation can be supported as an equilibrium if it is the
result of a series of sequential commitments by traders over time (in the interval [t0, T]). Each
commitment to participate induces further commitments by others. The level of participation at
the call (and other features of the outcome) is an easy projection of the accumulated committed
orders in the final moments before the call. Thus, given the sequence of commitments, the role
of expectations in determining the equilibrium outcome is significantly diminished.7
What form does the commitment of the traders take? In placing an order at time t, a
trader commits not to withdraw the order until the call. If he withdraws the order, he is charged
a fee equal to the fee that he would have been charged if his order had stayed in and had been
executed at the call.8 Therefore, everything else being equal, a trader may want to delay his
commitment until the last second before the call. Such behavior would completely defeat the
mechanism. To avoid such behavior, the exchange induces traders to commit early by
rewarding early commitment. Thus, the exchange offers lower fees to traders who commit at
an earlier time to participate in the upcoming call.9 Traders self-select the time at which they
enter their order. Less risk averse, more patient traders, with low demand for immediacy will
7 Thus, the proposed mechanism transforms orders into durable goods of varying durations.
Since orders are durable, they can be counted cumulatively, and the level of participation at time
T follows easily. See Economides and Himmelberg (1993) for a study of networks of durable
and non-durable goods.
8 Of course, no fees will be paid for an order that does not execute in the call because no
suitable match was found.
9 In practice, the electronic market of AZX utilizes differential fees to induce early
commitments to trade in the call.
6commit earliest. More risk averse traders will commit later.10 The optimal fee structure of a
monopolist-auctioneer of a call market is established in Economides and Heisler (1993a).11
The lower fee for early entrants rewards the extra liquidity that an early entrant brings to
the call in inducing others to participate in the market in the remaining time up to the call.
These early entrants allow the call to be a focal point in the competition with a continuous
market.
The fee structure that gives the highest benefit to the call market auctioneer makes the
last participant of the call (who signs up just before T) indifferent between participating at the
call and participating at the continuous market. All participants who committed earlier pay
strictly lower fees and are strictly better off by participating in the call market rather than at a
continuous market. Some very early traders may even be subsidized (i.e., charged a fee below
cost) to be compensated for the very large positive externality that they create in the market.
Economides and Heisler (1993a) also show that, once entry has started, there are no gaps in
trader arrival. That is, if the first trader enters at t1, t0 < t1 < T, there is always some trader who
enters at every instant between t1 and T.
10 Also, traders with large orders may be at greater risk of moving the market price in small
liquidity markets, and therefore may prefer the call more than the continuous market.
11 This mechanism is reminiscent of pricing by a price discriminating monopolist in Mussa
and Rosen (1978). The good "participating in the call market" is differentiated in quality
(vertically differentiated) so that all traders would prefer to enter later, everything else being
equal. The auctioneer of the call market sells the higher quality goods (entry near T) at a higher
price. However, he cannot fully implement an optimal price discrimination scheme that would
require selling at different prices (fees) to different traders who arrive at the same time, as well
as prohibiting arbitrage among entry times.
7The profit-maximizing call market auctioneer internalizes some of the externality of
liquidity provision by early entrants, but does not fully internalize the externality. Maximization
of the total benefit to society from the call market requires even lower fees to be charged to early
participants. A perfectly price discriminating monopolist call market auctioneer can decentralize
the total social benefit maximizing solution. However, the auctioneer in a typical call market is
unable to implement price discrimination, and therefore he cannot achieve social benefit
maximization.
The self-reinforcing nature of liquidity, as of any other network externality, creates the
possibility that often small size financial exchange networks will not be observed. That is, there
exists some positive size of a network, named critical mass nCM, below which no network is
observed. Thus, either no market of this type is observed, or a market of size at least nCM is
observed. It follows that one should not be surprised by very sudden growth of certain financial
networks, including call markets, as conditions change that make a market of critical mass just
sustainable.
We have shown earlier that the self-reinforcing nature of liquidity and the dependence on
beliefs and expectations of the size of the market (in the absence of the explicit mechanism we
propose) leads to a multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore history matters, i.e., historical events
may define which of the equilibrium outcomes is realized, and in particular which markets exist
and which do not. In that respect, it is important to note that there may be crucial time
inconsistencies. The technological conditions of yesterday may lead to the selection of
environment X, but the conditions of today may make system Y the inevitable choice if we had
not selected anything before. But, it is possible that, if we had selected X yesterday, today we
8may still want to continue with X. That is, it may take a very drastic improvement in certain
dimensions to make Y the best choice given the earlier selection of X. This process is further
complicated by the fact that the profits accruing to different parties will be different in different
environments and systems, and therefore the incentives for change will not in general be
coordinated.
Continuous markets are praised for their production of up-to-the-minute market-relevant
information, most notably market clearing bid and ask prices. This creates a potentially
significant criticism of traditional non-electronic call markets, which were essentially infrequent
exchanges of particular stocks. However, in an electronic market structured in the way described
in this paper, every participant can calculate the market clearing price during the period [t0, T].
Thus, although there are no transactions until time T, at a time t in [t0, T] there is an easy-to-
calculate price that reflects the equilibrium price if a clearing would have happened at that point
in time. Further, this price is validated by the cumulative orders on both sides of the market up
to that point t. Thus, even though this "would-be" clearing price at time t is not announced,
it is validated by a larger volume of orders than any particular clearing price at any point in time
in a continuous market.12 Therefore, the electronic call market produces timely information
of superior quality, and cannot be criticized on informational grounds. The volume-validated
"would-be" clearing price may serve as a better base for derivative calculations rather than the
price in the continuous market.
Price piracy is easy and common in financial markets. For example, prices established
at the NYSE are used on regional exchanges and proprietary systems in place of price discovery.
12 Of course, the volume of accumulated orders increases as time approaches T.
9This free riding on information weakens the exchanges where price is discovered as well as the
validity of the market price. The existence of piracy has created incentives for the exchanges
not to reveal the equilibrium price with accuracy. Thus, piracy can hurt transparency in
financial markets. Price piracy can similarly affect call markets by creating fragmentation,
reducing liquidity, and diminishing the validity of the discovered price. It is hard to eliminate
the incentive for price piracy without administrative measures.
In summary, this short paper focused on liquidity considerations in financial markets. We
demonstrated the liquidity advantages of call over continuous markets. Further, we analyzed a
structure of time-differentiated fees in a call market that guarantees high liquidity. We also
discuss the importance of critical mass and the creation and acquisition of price information on
market equilibrium, and ultimately on the market structure of financial exchanges.
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